I received 100 back scatter messages in my inbox today. As someone who receives mail for dozens of system email messages (like root@ and www-data@), this number is higher than usual, but not something so odd that it concerns me. Upon closer examination, however, I noticed two things different with these messages.

Normally, I get back scatter of two varieties: spammer emails joe@example.org. Joe is a legit user with a auto responder - so example.org accepts the spam, and then generates the auto response, which I receive. The second variety: spammer emails announce@lists.example.org. Since announce is a legit list, it is accepted by the mail server, handed off to the list server program, that programs notices that I'm not allowed to post, and generates an email warning me to that effect. These are some of the reasons SMTP is broken, but given the current state of SMTP, I don't have any good ideas on how to prevent this type of back scatter.

In contrast, the messages today were bounced with mailbox full and mailbox unavailable messages. These type of messages should not generate back scatter. It's 2008 and most mail servers are configured to reject messages for mailboxes that don't exist or are over quota, relying on the sending server to generate the bounce back. Since spammers usually email directly to the receiving servers, they don't bother generating the bounce back.

So why did I get these types of bounce backs? I carefully examined three messges and found one open relay (that's an old problem) and two MX servers that accepted delivery to mailboxes and then turned around and generated an over quota message (in one case) and a generic delivery failed (in the other case).

The open relay problem is an age old problem - nothing new here. I suspect the other problems are due to people setting up much more elaborate mail systems, ironically, in an attemp to fight spam. The strategy is to setup a server (which will act as the offical MX server that is the first to receive the message) whose function is to just scan for spam and viruses and then pass the message on to the server that will deliver the email message. The problem is when that first line server does not know how to reject messages for mailboxes that don't exist or are over quota. Instead, they accept all mail. If the server setup to deliver the messages can't deliver the message - they have no way of communicating this rejection to the original sending server - so they either have to generate an email bounce, or the MX front line server has to generate an email bounce.

The final element I noticed was that the original emails being sent had forged Received lines.

Here's one example:

    Received: from GMSEXC03.CORP.DS.GEMPLUS.COM ([]) by
                    GMSEXC05.CORP.DS.GEMPLUS.COM with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830);  Mon,
                    24 Mar 2008 21:41:15 +0100
    Received: from SINEXC01.CORP.DS.GEMPLUS.COM ([]) by
                    GMSEXC03.CORP.DS.GEMPLUS.COM with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830);  Mon,
                    24 Mar 2008 21:41:14 +0100
    Received: from mars.gemplus.com ([]) by
                    SINEXC01.CORP.DS.GEMPLUS.COM with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.1830);  Tue,
                    25 Mar 2008 04:41:14 +0800
    Received: from 83-70-211-36.b-ras1.chf.cork.eircom.net
                    (83-70-211-36.b-ras1.chf.cork.eircom.net []) by
                    mars.gemplus.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E3B62EACDF; Mon, 24 Mar 2008
                    20:41:05 +0000 (GMT)
    Received: from [] by leslie.mayfirst.org; Mon, 24 Mar 2008 20:41:05

You'll notice that the first received line (the one on the bottom) says that it was received by leslie.mayfirst.org from the IP address The second recieved line says that it was received by 83-70-211-36.b-ras1.chf.cork.eircom.net also from the IP address In other words, the first one, claiming to be recived by the mayfirst.org server, is clearly forged since the next line claims to have received the message from the same IP. All of this makes me very nervous about spam detection systems that block based on the original sending IP. Are they smart enough to see forgeries like this? This can be a very effective Denial of Service attack - scattering spam throughout the world claiming to have been originally received by the IP address of the mail system you want to target.